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ABSTRACT

Schools can help students understand moral issues, generate social change, and prepare for the future by combining dialogue and inquiry methods in moral education programs. Based upon the educational philosophy of John Dewey, the dialogue-inquiry method is interpreted to include a process whereby two or more persons reveal their feelings and thoughts to one another and a process whereby two or more persons ask and answer questions that are relevant to their situation. Dewey emphasized that students should be able to analyze both subjective and objective aspects of a situation and make personal contributions to social reform. Specifically, Dewey contributed the following basic concepts for clarifying human foresight and moral education: (1) an individual's state of mind influences his/her use of knowledge; (2) individual psychology influences whether a person will consider an act or judgment moral; and (3) humans are constantly influenced by objective and subjective factors. Many other psychologists and philosophers have considered objectives and methods of moral education. Included among these scholars are Martin Heidegger, Harold Rugg, Carl Jung, B. F. Skinner, Paul Tillich, Rollo May, and Lawrence Kohlberg. The conclusion is that schools can meet their moral education tasks if they re-formulate objectives in accordance with changing concepts of the good society, use a dialogue-inquiry method to supply normative corrections needed in the real world and balance social claims with personal needs. (DB)

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HUMAN FORESIGHT AND MORAL RE-EDUCATION

THE WORK OF THE SCHOOL

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This essay starts with the philosophy of John Dewey and his influence in shaping American education. The thesis then moves to the reconstruction of his philosophy. Human foresight and moral re-education are considered in the light of a reconstructed philosophy. They are defined as distinctively human enterprises that clarify present realities in preparing for a future which is at best imperfectly and only partially knowable. Power, levels of morality and stages of human development are considered in terms of their hierarchies and polarities. In conclusion the concept of a discipline of dialogue-inquiry is developed as the methodology for generating human foresight and achieving continuous moral re-education.

The John Dewey Tradition

In choosing only one of his many writings, it is appropriate to invite attention to Reconstruction in Philosophy, first published in 1920 and used as a basis for his lectures at the Imperial University of Japan in 1949. Dewey was concerned with dualisms and offered a reconstruction of science so as to make it useful in moral reconstruction when he writes:

> When the consciousness of science is fully impregnated with the consciousness of human value, the greatest dualism which now weights humanity down, the split between the material, the mechanical, the scientific and the moral and ideal will be destroyed. Human forces that now waver because of this division will be unified and reinforced.....wasteful conflict between naturalism and humanism is terminated.[1]

He underwrites the theme of moral re-education by saying:

> Man is under just as much obligation to develop his most advanced standards and ideals as to use conscientiously those which he already possesses. Moral life....is (thereby) rendered flexible, vital, growing.[2]

Also, Dewey anticipated a moral dynamism to safeguard against an arrogance based on final judgment and fixed human ends when he asserted:

> No individual or group will be judged by whether they come up to or fall short of some fixed results, but by the direction in which they are moving. The bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better. Such a conception makes one severe in judging himself and humane in judging others.[3]

Not only did Dewey create a tradition of reconstruction in philosophy, but he also addressed himself directly to the reconstruction of society. In writing in 1939 during the imminence of World War II, he reflected on what he had observed twenty years earlier. In the 1919 period two objectives were prominent in people's attention:

> the establishment of a system of international law that would ensure peaceful relations between nations; and the reorganization of social and economic relations within nations.[4]

In his essay of 1939, The Economic Basis of the New Society, he wrote:

> the evils existing then still exist now, the things needing to be done then still need to be done now.[5] ...the whole idea of social reorganization was an illusion.[6] ....If we fail to learn the lessons of the present day -- in fundamental respects identical with those of twenty years ago -- then we may be sure that twenty years hence our present most ardent hopes and inspired programs will also be dismissed as illusions.[7]

Without knowledge of Dewey's statements, in 1946 I analyzed the social scene and education pointing to: (1) the urgency of the one-world ideal; (2) the need for a stable and prosperous economy; (3) the necessity for reducing intergroup divisions and tensions; (4) the improved utilization of functional groups to make public policy; and (5) the need for a renewed democratic morale. As a response an education was described for preparing the student to make personal contributions to social reform, emphasizing that a satisfactory analysis of the social scene demands that education give attention to both its factual elements and

needs for change; the latter being, of course, normative (or moral) considerations.[8]

In 1978 we are still dealing with the same problems with perhaps no more confidence of success than Dewey observed in 1939. Whether we focus attention on Dewey's or my later analysis, social reconstruction is to an uncomfortable extent still an illusion. What lesson should we have learned? Dewey says society needs to

> ...learn to utilize the intelligence, the insight and foresight which are available, in order to take hold of the problem and to go after it, step by step, on the basis of an intelligent program...which represents an outlook upon the future of things which most immediately require doing...[9]

Dewey further elaborates:

> The problem today remains one of using available intelligence, of employing the immense resources science has put at our disposal: a pooled and coordinated social intelligence...[10]

He emphasized the concept of a continuously planning society in contrast to a planned society. He made his analysis imperative in writing:

> The method of social intelligence is primarily concerned with free determination of means to be employed. Until the method of social action is adapted we shall remain in a period of drift and unrest.[11]

The conclusion of this brief analysis of a sample of Dewey's thinking, meaningfully paralleling my independent thoughts, shows that his legacy is relevant to the theme of human foresight and moral re-education.

Even though disillusioned by the low level of societal reconstruction in America, nevertheless, Dewey was recognized as America's philosopher. He was accorded this honor officially by his colleagues in philosophy. Morris R. Cohen says:

> If there were such an office as that of national philosopher.... Dewey is the person who could most properly be mentioned for it.[12]

Dewey's endearment and enlightenment, recognized by the American people, is explained by Charles Frankel in the following:

> For the program of reconstruction in philosophy, morals and society which Dewey proposed can be understood only if we see that Dewey took the daily experience of individuals more seriously than he took anything else, and that he ultimately evaluated everything as an instrument for the enrichment of that experience.[13]

Further official recognition came "when the University of Paris, in 1930, awarded him an honorary degree, it referred to him as 'the most profound, most complete expression of American genius.'"[14]

As recently as 1968 Ernest Becker in his book: The Structure of Evil makes more than fifty page references to John Dewey. Becker says:

> He wanted philosophers to study man as an organism in society, and so offer knowledge that was relevant to actual human needs...it would result in a synthesis with science, education, morals, and religion... all his work centered on this problem (of synthesis), and it is safe to say that in this sense he was a figure of at least Kantian proportion...[15]

Dewey has been recognized as an influencial philosopher in educational matters in the first half of the twentieth century through his thinking and writings and through the leadership he provided the progressive education movement.[16] I sense that his influence is still present in latent and incipient form in educational affairs. In addition to my sense, my colleague Herbert M. Kliebard has recently said:

> Unfortunately, time has permitted only a sketchy outline of Dewey's evolving curriculum theory. It is worthy of years of study. But even in such a gross outline form, some features of an entity we can call curriculum theory may become clear.[17]

Others have recently given attention to Dewey's writing -- Charles E. Silberman in his book: Crisis in the Classroom,[18] and Lawrence Kohlberg in his writings on human development and moral education. More recently, in arguing for a philosophical anthropology of education, the existential philosopher

Leroy F. Troutner says this of Dewey:

> Only a few years ago historians were describing the demise of progressive education, but today Dewey's ideas are far from dead. He is in fact enjoying what might be described as a quiet renaissance.[19]

In connection with both societal and educational reconstruction, Dewey has advocated the advancement of behaviorism. This emphasis is strikingly developed in his Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology in the following excerpt:

> There is no one who can be safely trusted to be exempt from immediate reactions of criticism, and there are few who do not need to be braced by occasional expressions of approval. But these influences are immensely overdone in comparison with the assistance that might be given by the influence of social judgments which operate without accompaniments of praise and blame; which enable an individual to see for himself what he is doing, and which put him in command of a method of analyzing the obscure and usually unavowed forces which move him to act. We need a permeation of judgments of conduct by the method and materials of a science of human nature.[20]

Dewey's view of behaviorism embraces an objectivism-subjectivism continuum, while Skinner and his associates limit their conception solely to objectivism. Dewey's view is amendable to further development and reconstruction, as we shall see at a later juncture when consideration is given to existentialism and Jung's analytical psychology. Skinner's variety can only be further developed through empiricism and technological refinements. It has come to an impass in being helpful to the educational enterprise.

In Dewey's formulation there are opposite poles -- objectivism and subjectivism, which are continuous one to the other connected by a process. In what may well be his last writing, published in 1952 the year he died at age 93, he emphasized continuities and process. He wrote:

> When process is seen to be the 'universal' in nature and life, continuity...becomes the regulative principle of all inquiry that claims to be scientific.[21]

I would demure in Dewey's use of the term scientific because of the narrow meaning given to the term in many quarters in 1978. I offer the substitution of "all inquiry that claims to be humanly and scholarly sound."

An earlier essay of Dewey's, written in 1941, carried the title: "The Objectivism-Subjectivism of Modern Philosophy." It is so relevant to the thesis of human foresight and moral re-education that I am attempting to develop that three extended citations will be made from the essay. The first deals with the organism as an object, the term subjectivism, acculturation and awareness.

> The organism is one 'object' among others. However, the function of organic factors is so distinctive that it has to be discriminated. When it is discriminated, it is seen to be so different in kind from that of physical subject-matter as to require a special name. As a candidate for the name, 'subjective' has one great disadvantage, namely, its traditional use as a name for some sort of existential stuff called physical or mental. It has on the other hand, the advantage of calling attention to the particular agency through which the function is exercised, a singular organism, an organism that has been subjected to acculturation, and is aware of itself as a social subject and agent.[22]

In the second quotation, Dewey calls attention to personal-social factors, reinstating those that may be dismissed by skeptics.

> What is not sufficiently noted is that definite differentation of personal-social factors in their functions in the production of things of experience is now part of the technique of controlling the experienced presence of objects; <u>with further advance of behavioral psychology</u> it will become of constant increased importance. The old stock-in-trade of wholesale skepticism, namely, dreams, illusions, hallucinations, the effects of organic defects, of beliefs locally held, is now in practical fact a positive resource in the management of experience.[23]

The phrase <u>with further advance of behavioral psychology</u> is underscored to invite attention to a limitation in Dewey's position which was evident to me in 1969. In connection with the human development laboratory that was used in the planned educational change project of the University of Wisconsin R and D Center, I wrote:

> The laboratory finds its knowledge-base and justification in the behavioral sciences and humanistic disciplines. This foundation... makes the laboratory an enterprise in integrating scientific and humanistic disciplines...(for the participant), the experience of laboratory training draws part of its meaning--perhaps its most significant aspects of meaning--from the covert and subjective functioning of the individual. This suggests an existential or phenomenological approach to what is real. The use of the arts as human expression and communication facilitates the kind of interaction among participants that enhances their learning...the laboratory approach needs to make use of as much science as available, both methods and results, but other disciplines are needed to make it as humanistically oriented as required by the concepts of human functioning and its cultivation.[24]

I would now correct Dewey's very important and clear statement above by being more explicit regarding humanistic disciplines in my view. I would now add: the philosophies of existentialism and phenomenology, and psychoanalysis with particular emphasis given to Jung's analytical psychology. These matters will be dealt with in sufficient detail at a later juncture. I now wish to return to Dewey's essay on objectivism and subjectivism.

In the third citation, the objective and the subjective are seen as two sets of conditions that need to be brought into cooperative interaction. Also, creative intelligence is seen as dependent upon a cooperative interaction.

> Philosophy will become modern in a pregnant sense when the objectivism-subjectivism involved is seen to be a cooperative interaction of two distinguishable sets of conditions, so that knowledge of them in their distinction is required in order that their interaction may be brought under intentional guidance. Without such knowledge, intelligence is inevitably held down to techniques for making mechanical permutations and combinations of things that have been experienced, and mankind is dependent upon accident for introduction of novelty.[25]

In discussing creative discovery and logical verification as related to imagination, in his book: Imagination, Harold Rugg notes a distortion of Dewey's intention to embrace the entire range of though -- the scientist and the artist, in the term 'complete act'. Rugg writes:

> The contemporary absorption of schools and colleges in problem-solving and their neglect of creative discovery has been brought about by an an uncritical acceptance of Dewey's work on the scientific method of

> inquiry which actually sought to bridge the gulf between the two approaches to thinking noted above.[26]

Leroy F. Troutner, in his essay: John Dewey and the Existential Phenomenology, has found a more substantial limitation in Dewey's thinking that cannot be "rationalized-away" as Rugg tends to do with the suggested shortcoming he sees in Dewey's philosophy and its educational application. Troutner writes:

> No one would deny that Dewey was a great liberal, a true democrat who believed in the dignity and integrity of the individual, but according to his philosophy the individual is not positioned at the center of his lived experience.[27]

In further delineation, Troutner goes on to say:

> Dewey positions the problematic event, which is amenable to scientific treatment, at the center of his formulation...Dewey is a humanist in the best sense of the word. But as he focuses on the 'how' of realizing the proper conditions, Dewey's conception of man is forced to fit into the Procrustean bounds of his larger concern. One cannot combine being human, with all the psychic density of that condition, and the scientific method, with all its objectivity, without badly distorting one or the other. In this case it is man who is pushed out of shape.... In the experimentalists world of experience, meaning is objective, knowledge is objective, habits are objective, emotions are objective, and intelligence is objective.[28]

In the last quotation Troutner may have over-emphasized objectivity in view of our documentation above regarding Dewey's concept of objectivism-subjectivism in modern philosophy. Dewey has not, however, amplified the personal and subjectivistic pole of the polarity-continuum with the force and clarity that I find in the writings of existentialists and phenomenologists. In this connection John Wild's Existence and the World of Freedom[29] has been particularly useful to me.

Troutner's suggested correction of the Dewey tradition is provided in a plan of partnership. He points to two conditions of pragmatism that will have to be modified:

> ...addiction to the scientific method to the exclusion of all other approaches must be repudiated...[30] and to give up attempting to rid philosophy of the transcended self.[31]

Pragmatism and existentialism have different concepts of human choice-making which is an essential component of both human foresight and moral re-education. Rightfully, Troutner insists that choice-making must include both the evaluating-of-action-in-terms-of-consequences that the experimentalist emphasizes and Heidegger's description of:

> ...choice more as a projection which can be lived authentically or inauthentically.[32]

with psychological importance for the development of self.

On a comprehensive front dealing with the full range of educational meaning today, Troutner indicates that:

> ...we also need to include both Dewey's social emphasis and the existentialist's individual emphasis. Education includes both the transmission of culture and the becoming of an Individual.[33]

Troutner summarizes as follows:

> In order to see education in its widest possible context it is necessary to include both thinking about experience, with all its explanations, mediations, and inferences, and experiencing experience, with all its moods, frustrations, and satisfactions. This is why we need a perspectival partnership of both Dewey and the existentialists if we are to develop a workable theory of education.[34]

I am in agreement with Troutner's analysis and recommendation. The educator, as both practitioner and scholar, needs to center and then re-center again on the basic polarity-continuum of objectivism and subjectivism as he deals with this issue and then that issue of theory and practice. Existentialism and phenomenology provide intellectual clarity and orientation to the subjectivistic pole in <u>continuity and process</u> (which Dewey has emphasized) with objectivism which Dewey's philosophy, even after the proposed reconstruction, may continue admirably to provide for the scientist, the social reformer and the educator.

To bear a tradition responsibly, a person is required both to criticize and to re-create the tradition. One reconstruction of Dewey's philosophy has

been presented. Another reconstruction has been suggested by E.A. Burtt in his book: In Search of Philosophic Understanding. He writes:

> The most provocative note...I want to share is the conviction that philosophy must come fully to terms with the psychoanalytic conception of the human mind. In view of the solid confirmation and spreading influence of this conception the crucial fact can no longer be ignored that behind anyone's way of thinking there are not only motivations other than the desire for truth, which we vaguely know already, but also unconscious motivations--or at least, those that are such till they are lifted to conscious awareness...when the presence of such motivations in one's own philosophizing as well as in that of others is fully acknowledged, there is no arrogance, and I am sure that the acknowledgment can lead to confident progress.[35]

I find Ira Progoff's conclusion sound that Jung's psychology is useful to the humanities and social sciences, whereas Freud's writings have not proven helpful. I have found Progoff's book: Jung's Psychology and Its Social Meaning a very useful interpretation. To my knowledge, Dewey makes only one insignificant reference to Jung, but makes several references to the unconscious in his Art as Experience. He never, however, deals with unconscious or psyche phenomena with any sympathy and penetration.

Jung's psychology rests upon the basic assumption that the social quality of man is inherent in human nature, thus avoiding John Locke's conception that society is a plurality of individuals that form a social compact, either to serve their own interests and convenience or by force. In Jung's view the individual is no more possible without society, prior to his being, than is a human psyche functioning without a culture. The basic concepts of Jung render his system of thinking useful to interdisciplinary enterprises.

As a philosopher, Burtt, in his statements quoted above, is reaching for the unconscious part of the human psyche so as to get better control over the processes of philosophizing. Jung's concept of the unconscious, which is integrated with the conscious in human functioning, is further differentiated into the personal unconscious and the collective or objective unconscious. As

we shall see, the latter concept is useful in societal reconstruction, while Freud's limited concept of the personal unconscious is useful only in individual psychoanalysis. Jung derives the deeper or more primordial levels of the unconscious not from individual experience, but from the great communal experience of mankind according to Progaff who says further:

> ...and he thus places social factors at the origin of the psyche.[36]

As a philosopher, Burtt has undoubtedly discovered, as I have, the concept of the unconscious, particularly the collective, is viewed by many scholars and specialists outside of schools of psychiatry and institutes of psychoanalysis as being esoteric. The naturalness and the humanness of the concept are demonstrated in the imaginative and non-technical writings of Sigurd F. Olson. In his essay on intuition in his book Reflections From the North Country, he writes:

> Intuition is the response of the subconscious mind arising from the depths of the vast pool of racial awareness which encompasses all experience, not only of our own species but of the form from which we have come. Students of the brain are convinced we operate only in the upper tenth of our gray matter; below it, like an iceberg, is a vast storage network of memories embodying all man has ever thought or experienced.[37]

The question for the social reformer is how to mobilize this vast storage network of human and non-human memories so that their substance of images and and ideas are made available to man living today. The how-question will be addressed at a later juncture.

The difference between Dewey's and Jung's thought, and the reason for the effort to integrate Jung's views with Dewey's, are made clear by the distinction between the objective and the subjective. Dewey frequently and in different contexts uses the concept of communication and invites attention to the connection between communication and community. Jung carefully draws a distinction between communication and the symbol. The model of the behaviorist,

and Dewey's thinking has this aspect of behaviorism, is semiotic in that a word or sign becomes an analogous or abbreviated expression of a known thing. In speech the word dog may be a verbal sign for a dog-object known to the speaker and his audience.

This semiotic concept fits well with Dewey's objectivism and is amendable to scientific method. Jung has something different in mind which emphasizes the subjectivist pole of the basic polarity-continuum. Progoff explains Jung's definition of a symbol which may be implicit in Dewey's writings, but which, if so, should in my view be made explicit and developed as an aspect of the emerging tradition.

Progoff writes:

> The characteristic of the symbol is that it opens up beyond itself, touching in the form of a representation something that the understanding does not fully encompass, but into which it wishes to reach. The symbol, taken in this sense, therefore, cannot be a means of communication, since it does not refer to any specifically known thing. It is a direct, continuing experience of something real, which is yet indefinable (but not completely indefinable) for man, and in itself in need of signs in order that its presence may be communicated.[38] (I have editorially inserted the words: but not completely indefinable.)

About the concept of the archetype, Jung's cardinal idea, Progoff writes further in the same vein:

> ...is...not an assumption of his, as it is sometimes assumed to be, but a deduction made from the universal nature of the psyche in an effort to understand the varieties of symbol formation.[39]

Jung used the term primordial image in his early writing. The German sociologist Karl Mannheim has used the terms, paradigmatic experience and archetype interchangeably. Mannheim's main interests have been the analysis of idealogy and the many aspects of man and society that are embraced in his book: Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction.[40] In his essay: Toward a New Social Philosophy, Mannheim says that the disintegration or despiritualization of modern life:

> ...mainly consists in the evaporation of primordial images or archetypes which have directed the life-experience of mankind through ages....Without paradigmatic experiences no consistent conduct, no character formation and no real human coexistence and co-operation are possible.[41]

Mannheim uses, as an example, the archetypal structure of Christianity to emphasize a dimension of humanism that is lacking in the pragmatic modality of scientific method. As the existentialist has confronted Dewey's thinking in the call for a partnership by Troutner as we saw above, an integration between Jung's thinking and Mannheim's analysis on the one hand, is being developed. Mannheim writes:

> The person who denies the significance of spiritual norms (archetypes) may adjust himself to certain demands of the social situation as well as the Christian does. What then is the difference between them? It can be found in the fact that the Christian does not simply want to adjust himself to the world in general or to the particle of the environment in which he finds himself, but he wants to do so only in terms of an adjustment which, among other possible adjustments, is in harmony with his basic experience of life.[42]

Mannheim was aware of Jung's writings which awareness lends support to the proposition that their thoughts integrated with and reinforced one another. In direct reference to archetypes, Mannheim writes:

> For us it is...important to prove their presence in the history of our cultural development, especially to analyze the social function they fulfill, and to point to the unfilled gap and the disturbances which are caused if they disappear.[43]

Progoff extends Mannheim's meaning and uses Jung's concept of archetype in a very clear and concrete manner in the following:

> The question is whether the occidental peoples can continue to live as they are with only a <u>morgue</u> of symbols to supply them with the meanings of life. From Jung's point of view, this is impossible; <u>periodic confusion, paralysis of spirit</u>, and <u>ultimate breakdown</u> are bound to result. That is the negative side, and on the affirmative side is the fact that as a result of the impoverishment of symbols, the psyche must in time, out of the nature of its <u>inherent creativity</u>, bring forth new symbols from within itself. Eventually <u>new faiths</u> must arise and new meanings be born because the principle of opposites prevents a vacuum from lasting long.[44]

This analysis makes the subjectivism of Dewey's objectivism-subjectivism

exceedingly important and its cultivation crucial if new symbols are to arise that relate to social and cultural crises through which Western civilization is now passing. Dewey's philosophy with its limitation to scientific method, and standing alone, is inadequate to the task of societal reconstruction. With Troutner's request for a partnership with existentialism, a second partnership involving Dewey is required with the analytical psychology of Jung.

Mannheim has demonstrated that a society has an idealogical foundation that basically directs the activities of its members.[45] When a society is in need of reconstruction--when suffering from the crisis of conflicting idealogical elements--the basic normative or idealogical matrix has to be re-created "at the bottom of society". In the absence of such a primordial regeneration, a society will further disintegrate and finally fall. Dewey recognized the need for regeneration in most of his writings. For example in his Reconstruction in Philosophy cited above and in his last essay: Modern Philosophy contained in the book: The Cleavage in Our Culture, he emphasized the reduction of dualism. In his introduction to his book: Problems of Men, Dewey aptly quotes Matthew Arnold when he speaks of contemporary man as: "wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born".

In addition to Mannheim, others have pointed to the inadequacy of pragmatism (or John Dewey's philosophy) to deal with societal reconstruction when a society is in crisis. Charles Frankel, a colleague of Dewey's, has clearly indicated the weakness of pragmatism, at least as popularly conceived, in the following:

> If pragmatism as an everyday attitude is to prevail and to succeed, there has to be, ... a reservoir of mutual trust and goodwill in society, and some fairly firm and restraining norms of behavior. And this, of course, is precisely what most everyday advocates of everyday pragmatism have assumed to be the case. The essential stability and decency of society, and the existence of a basic moral concensus, have been the unspoken premises on which popular pragmatism has rested. For only under such a condition can the concentration on Method and the love of Technique not collapse into pure Machiavellianism .[46]

When disintegration is of crisis proportion and a basic moral concensus is no longer in existence, then clearly a philosophy is required that is adequate to the task. The inadequacy of pragmatism is underscored by George C. Lodge in his book: The New American Ideology. The long subtitle is also very appropriate to our thesis of human foresight and moral re-education as states:

> How the ideological basis of legitimate authority in America is being radically transformed--the profound implications for our society in general and the great corporation in particular.[47]

According to Lodge, the traditional American ideology was derived from John Locke's paradigm which emphasizes individualism, property rights, competition, the limited state and in association with Newton's scientific paradigm, scientific specialization and fragmentation. In urging the importance of ideological analysis, Lodge writes:

> ....the pragmatist must assume the existence of a valid ideology, even as he denies the need of its existence. Indeed, during the heyday of this mode of thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such an assumption was acceptable, although logically absurd.
> ....pragmatism is useful as a method of philosophy only when a valid ideology serves to provide an adequate community concensus. If a community's problems derive from ideological failure, then there is no pragmatic remedy, and to seek one only delays the necessary ideological inspection and renovation.[48]

In carefully examining Dewey's writings, I do not find sufficient analysis of the need for ideological inspection and renovation. I do find such a basis in Jung's writings, however, as he gives clarity and force to the relevancy of his concepts of the collective unconscious, the archetype and symbol, particularly as they influence self-integration and relate the individual to spiritual and religious considerations. I find in these concepts a resource for normative or ideological regeneration that is needed as an integration with Dewey's philosophy of instrumentalism (or scientific intelligence).

The function of the arts as a humanizing influence upon "man and society in an age of reconstruction" needs to be more deeply integrated in the Dewey

tradition. Frankel has written about Dewey's writings:

> There is a coherent theory of experience that propels them. This theory is best formulated in Art as Experience, the most revealing of Dewey's books....

Dewey's colleague, the late philosopher Horace S. Fries was impressed by Dewey's suggestion that

> art be considered as the name for all agencies by which is affected a union of ideas and knowledge with the non-natural factors in human make-up.... Art is the communication of novel, nonconceptual meanings which have not been--perhaps cannot be--conceptualized, yet which must be communicated if there is to be mutual understanding in the culture.[49]

In terms of Jung's distinction between communication and the symbol, described above, Fries and Dewey are speaking of the symbol rather than semiotic communication. This statement regarding art is of singular importance since Fries' essay is on "social planning" which is closely associated with the theme of human foresight and moral education and appeared with Dewey's essay in the book: The Cleavage in Our Culture.

Fries continues:

> In order adequately to problemize novel situations, there must be a non-conceptual sensitivity to the materials which, as it were, dissolves the rigid boundaries of traditional concepts without loss of their meanings, and precipitates them again in a form of new crystals to be employed for the new problem. It is this aspect of creative thinking which lends to it its mysterious air of genius or inspiration.[50]

Dewey conceived inquiry or problem-solving as the transformation of a confused or conflicted situation into one so determinant and unified that the actor or actors could act confidently. Fries goes beyond Dewey in referring to a non-conceptual sensitivity to materials in order adequately to problemize novel situations. This is a creative act that requires the symbolizing of the artist, and, indeed, the creation of new archetypes through sensitivity to both the personal and collective unconscious as Jung conceives them as human functions. In their symbolizing function, the arts are resources for the ideological

reconstruction of a culture, a conception of art that is suggested more clearly in Fries' formulation than in Dewey's Art as Experience.

Fries makes a reference to Herbert Read's writings in which he drew very substantially upon Jung. Relevant references are: Education Through Art, Icon and Idea, The Function of Art in the Development of Human Consciousness, and The Form of Things Unknown. Latent and incipient as are the functions of the arts in developing the person, the thinking process and human culture in Dewey's thought, these emphases need to be refreshed and extended. Read's writings are a resource for re-creating the aspects of art only hinted at in the Dewey tradition--namely those aspects dealing with self-integration, the archetype and symbol, and the personal unconscious and collective unconscious, aspects that are grossly neglected by Dewey.

In concluding the analysis of the Dewey tradition there are three principles that he has formulated that serve as a bridge in meeting current needs of "man and society in an age of reconstruction." They also form premises for the thesis of human foresight and moral re-education.

The first principle is crucial in the application of knowledge and the implementation of a policy. In the essay: "Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality" written early in his career, Dewey writes:

> There is no road open from any generic formula to an individual judgment. The road leads through the habits and mental attitudes of the one engaged in judging.[51]

Elsewhere, Dewey explains by using a reference to a physician, as he could have referred to a parent, teacher, engineer, minister, business man or government official.

> If the physician is careless and arbitrary because of overanxiety to get his work done, or if he lets his pecuniary needs influence his manner of judgment, we may say that he has failed both logically and morally...the ground for such...failure lies in his own habit or disposition.

> The generic propositions or universals of science can take effect, in a word, only through the medium of the habits and impulsive tendencies of the one who judges. They have no modus operandi of their own.[52]

Dewey's writings would have been more complete if he had used the psychoanalytic concept of self-awareness to illuminate the functioning of habits, disposition and impulsive tendencies. The psychoanalyst Erich Fromm in his book: The Heart of Man: its genius for good and evil, makes self-awareness crucial to morality and, therefore, an important aspect of moral re-education. Fromm writes:

> Awareness means that the person makes that which he learns his own, by experiencing it, experimenting with himself, observing others and, eventually, gaining a conviction rather than having an irresponsible 'opinion'. But deciding on the general principles is not enough. Beyond the awareness one needs to be aware of the balance of forces within oneself, and the rationalizations which hide the unconscious forces.[53]

The second principle is similar to the first and comes from the context of the school and the education of the child. Appropriately, the principle is found in the book: The Dewey School. In writing about the evolution of Dewey's principles of education, Mrs. Edwards says:

> ...the principle of growth was also the basis of Dewey's psychological analysis of what constitutes a moral act, moral conduct, and character ...he early pointed out and has steadily maintained the identity of so-called moral education and all kinds of education and growth. The kernel of the principle is this--the moral act is the consciously completed act which expresses the unified self.[54]

The psychic integration of the self as preparation for the moral act--bringing the mental health of education and moral education into an integration, is further elaborated by Mrs. Edwards as follows:

> When action is not achieved by the cooperation of thought and will, the deed represents whichever self has proved the stronger and is therefore, according to Dewey's theory, not a complete act-- one which represents the whole self, where one self has achieved a victory over the other. Where the objective self (the thinking self) does not carry the subjective, the really interested self along with it, but insists

> upon action without such agreement, the act represents only part of the self. The ideal has resulted in deed without the complete backing of the original impulse, full interest in the deed is lacking, and complete satisfaction therefore cannot result. The agent convinced against his will is of the same opinion still. Or, if the subjective interested self rushes into unconsidered action, the agent is said to have acted against his better judgment. In either case, part of the self is unexpressed and is unsatisfied with what is done. This partial self has been suppressed and the deed represents a divided, a disintegrated self. Such a deed is not genuine and therefore is not, according to the theory, moral.[55]

The Deweyan conception of personality dynamics has been paralleled by other writers. In discussing valuations, beliefs, and opinions the social scientist Myrdal distinguishes between the intellectual and cognitive on the one hand and the emotional and volitive on the other. He further clarifies:

> The beliefs express our ideas about how reality actually is, or was, while the valuations express ideals of how it ought to be, or ought to have been.[56]

People's expressed opinions are usually a blend of beliefs and valuations. Personal functioning is further confused by shifting and contradictory valuations. Myrdal explains:

> Behind <u>behavior</u> there is not one homogeneous set of valuations but a mesh of struggling inclinations, interests, and ideals. Some of these are held consciously and some are suppressed for long intervals, but all of them work to move behavior in their particular direction. There are no solid "attitudes", and behavior normally becomes a moral compromise. Valuations are, so to speak, located on different levels of the moral personality, in the main corresponding to various degrees of generality of moral judgments. In our civilization people ordinarily agree that, as an abstract proposition, the more general valuations--felt to be valid in the relation to the whole nation or even to all human beings--are morally "higher" than those relating to particular individuals or groups.[57]

Myrdal continues to describe personality dynamics, in a manner not too dissimilar to Dewey's conception, in the following:

> ...people often try to conceal (their evaluations), <u>qua valuations</u>, particularly the operative ones on the lower level.... People, in their opinions, generally underplay valuations by stating their positions as if they were simply logical inferences from what they believe to be true about reality. They seek "good reasons" which usually cannot qualify as "true reasons". Their opinions then become what are called rationalizations.[58]

I would only extend Myrdal's analysis, as I have supplemented Dewey's analysis above, by Fromm's stated need for self-awareness focusing attention particularly on awareness

> of the balance of forces within oneself, and the rationalizations which hide the unconscious forces.[59]

The third principle is extracted from Dewey's conception of objectivism-subjectivism in modern philosophy. When a society is in crisis and is in need of ideological reconstruction blind fixation upon the pole of objectivism is not only inadequate, but is also dangerous. The pragmatism and scientific method of objectivism lack the power to serve the needs of man and society in an age of reconstruction, to use again Mannheim's apt phrase. The task of both personal and societal transformation requires a centering and a recentering on the continuum-polarities of objectivism and subjectivism. These are the master polarities, identified by Dewey, that underly such intermediate pairs of opposities which Schumacher identifies and says

> of which freedom and order and growth and decay are the most basic... and...put tension into the world, a tension that sharpens man's sensitivity and increases his self-awareness. No real understanding is possible without awareness of these pairs of opposites (and many more) which permeate everything man does.[60]

The continuity and process of life which Dewey has emphasized in his philosophy involve a centering and re-centering on the objectivism-subjectivism polarities-continium. Ferkiss has expressed a similar notion;

> that humanity seeks to remain in balance while moving forward.[61]

Dewey asked for a cooperative interaction between the pair of opposites--objectivism and subjectivism, a process to be brought under intentional guidance. Without this intentional guidance: "mankind is dependent upon accident for introduction of novelty." I would interpret intentional guidance as centering and re-centering, a human happening that is eloquently described by the poet and the potter M.C. Richards in the following:

> We are transformed by bringing into center all the elements of our sensations and our thinking and our emotions and our will.... All the dark void in us of our undiscovered selves, all the small light of our discovered being, all the drive of our hungers, and our fairest and blackest dreams. All, all the elements come into center, into union with all the other elements. And in such a state they become quite different in function than when they are separated and segregated and discriminated between and against. When we act out of an inner unity, when all of our selves is present in what we do, then we can be said to be "on center".... Our wholeness as persons is expressed in using all of our selves in any given act. In this way the self integrates its capacities into a personal potency, as a being who serves life from his center at every instant. In this way knowledge can become a quality of consciousness and illuminates our behavior spontaneously and truthfully...[62]

Hierachies and Polarities in Human Development

Dewey has contributed three basic concepts for clarifying the thesis of human foresight and moral re-education. They are: (1) the notion of the human agent whose psychological-state-of-affairs is influential in the use of knowledge and the implementation of a policy; (2) the formulation of a connection between harmony or unity of the agent's psychological-state-of-affairs and the moral quality of the agent's act or judgment; and (3) the notion of the master objectivism-subjectivism continium upon which the human agent continuously centers and re-centers as he engages with his existence.

In one of his writings, Paul Tillich distinguishes between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of human experience. In his book: A Guide For the Perplexed, Schumacher re-instates with great emphasis the vertical dimension in philosophical discourse. Without the vertical dimension, the sense of hierarchy or the senses of the "higher" and "lower" are missing in human affairs. There is no ideal to strive for and no discrimination possible for forming a basis for human foresight and morality. Schumacher places great store in self-awareness, as different from consciousness, in connection with human development on the vertical dimension in the following:

> A human being can indeed strain and stretch toward a higher and induce a process of growth.... But people within whom the power of self-awareness is poorly developed cannot grasp it as a separate power and tend to take it as nothing but a slight extension of consciousness. Hence we are given a large number of definitions of man which make him out to be nothing but an exceptionally intelligent animal, or a political animal, or an unfinished animal, or simply a naked ape.[63]

These lower conceptions of the human being rule out morality and self-awareness that is a necessary condition for moral re-education.

Not only did Tillich deal with the vertical dimension or hierarchy of human development, but he also was very much aware of polarities in his own life. In an essay: On the Boundary, he spells out such boundaries as between social classes; between one's own will and the obligations of the citizen; between reality and imagination; between religion and culture; and between church and society. Tillich writes:

> ...the concept of the boundary...(is)...the fitting symbol for the whole of my personal and intellectual development. At almost every point, I have had to stand between alternative possibilities of existence, to be completely at home in neither and to take no definite stand against either. Since thinking presupposed receptiveness to new possibilities, this position is fruitful for thought: but it is difficult and dangerous in life, which again and again demands decisions and thus the exclusion of alternatives...[64]

Tillich was dealing with what Schumacher has defined as divergent problems which do not admit to solution by the use of Dewey's scientific method as do convergent problems. Problems of human foresight and morality are divergent problems. As an example, Schumacher analyzes the problem of how to educate that involves the polarities of freedom and discipline (obedience). He writes:

> ...here is a pair of perfect opposites. No compromise is possible. It is either one or the other.... Logic does not help us because it insists that if a thing is true its opposite cannot be true at the same time. It also insists that if a thing is good, more of it will be better. Here we have a very typical and very basic problem, which I call a divergent problem, and it does not yield to ordinary "Straight-line" logic; it demonstrates that life is bigger than logic.[65]

Schumacher continues in a way that supports the integration of the philosophy of existentialism with Dewey's philosophy as well as, in my view, the integration with Jung's analytical psychology.

> How can opposites cease to be opposites when a 'higher force' is present? How is it that liberty and equality cease to be mutually antagonistic and become 'reconciled' when brotherliness is present? These are not logical but existential questions. The main concern of existentialism, it has been noted, is that experience has to be admitted as evidence... That opposites are transcended when 'higher forces' -- like love and compassion -- intervene is not a matter to be argued in terms of logic; it has to be experienced in one's actual existence (hence: existentialism).[66]

Hierarchies and polarities in human development have the nature of a paradox. In both the development of the person and the development of a social system, the Gestalt therapist Arnold R. Beisser has presented a paradoxical theory of change.[67] At the personal level the core of the theory is:

> that change occurs when one becomes what he is, not when he tries to become what he is not. Change does not take place through a coercive attempt by the individual or by another person to change him, but it does take place if one takes the time and effort to be what he is - to be fully invested in his current position.[68]

Becoming aware of what he is means for the person to become aware, and thereby be able to accept, the polarities that are present in his current position on a continium. When centered in full awareness then a re-centering is possible. He can experience and experiment with a new center in seeking a point of personal unity that is appropriate to the social system in which the person is currently involved.

This action of differentiation and re-integration is facilitated through a process of dialogue and inquiry which involves interaction with other actors. This process can be applied directly to developing a social system. A school faculty, for example, may be polarized or differentiated on an issue such as development of the whole child vs the teaching of the basic skills.

Each member of the faculty goes to one pole or the other and formulates questions for colleagues at the opposite pole. Re-integration takes place through a dialogue-inquiry process.

Beisser has provided a theory to explain the practical application I have described above. He writes:

> ....orderly change within social systems is in the direction of integration and holism; further, that the social change agent has as his major function to work with and in an organization so that it can change consistently with the changing dynamic equilibrium both within and outside the organization. This requires that the system become conscious of alienated fragments within and without so it can bring them into the main functional activities by processes similar to identification in the individual. First, there is an awareness within the system that an alienated fragment exists; next that fragment is accepted as a legitimate outgrowth of a functional need that is then explicitly and deliberately mobilized and given power to operate as an explicit force. This, in turn, leads to communication with other subsystems and facilitates an integrated harmonious development of the whole system.[69]

Sullivan, the inventor of interpersonal psychiatry, has stated that until one is able to integrate with himself, he is not able to integrate with others.[70] There is a reflexive and mutual influence between the person and the social system. An integrated person can potentially, at least, if not actually, influence the development of a system of which he is a member. Also, as Beisser has written:

> it has become apparent that the most crucial issue before us is the development of a society that supports the individual in his individuality.[71]

The Phenomenon of Human Power

The phenomenon of power as an aspect of human foresight and moral re-education may be dealt with in terms of hierarchies and polarities. Power enters into planning and the exercise of foresight, as well as into the implementation of concrete projects in that power is a condition for dealing

realistically with the future. Without the availability and effective use of power, foresight, planning and human intervention of any kind are exercises in futility.

In his book: Power and Innocence, May indicates two items of conventional wisdom regarding the concept of power that need examination. The items are: (1) that to be innocent of power and its use may be a virtue and therefore no confrontation with power is desirable; and (2) that power is a monolithic concept and phenomenon with the implication that a person or institution either has power and uses it or doesn't have power and therefore doesn't use it. May differentiates qualities and types of power. Defining power generically as ability or competence, May clarifies further:

> Power is the ability to cause or prevent change. It has two dimensions. One is power as potentiality, or latent power. This is power that has not yet been fully developed, it is ability to cause a change at some future time. We speak of the future change as possibility, a word which comes directly from the same root as power, namely posse, 'to be able'. The other dimension is power as actuality.[72]

May emphasizes the power of the person in the following:

> For the living person, power is not a theory but an ever-present reality which we must confront, use, enjoy and struggle with a hundred times a day.[73]

There is a hierarchy of personal power that May differentiates as follows:

4 ----------power of aggression

3 ----------power of self-assertion ↗

2 ----------power of self-affirmation ↗

1 --power to be ↗

Moving from a lower level to a higher one is movement from a lower order of personal power to a higher and more ideal level of power. May warns that frustration of personal power development in such an orderly transformation

that is suggested by the hierarachy, may lead to the exercise of the power of violence and destruction which is pathological.

Social power is a necessary condition in the operation of a social system. Social power is the control of resources by one person or group by which the controller can either harm or help another person or group. May differentiates the qualities and types of social power in the following manner:

5 ---------- Nutrient (power for the other, helping others to develop power)
4 ---------- Integrative (power with another, cooperative team work)
3 ---------- Competitive (power against another, getting ahead, self up--the other down)
2 ----- Manipulative (power over others, control of others to the advantage of self and position)
1 Exploitative (power in using others, taking advantage of others)

Exploitative power is a lower level while nutrient power is the higher of the various levels in the hierarchy. Nutrient power is the more ideal. It may be suggested that as the norms of an institution that regulate the distribution and use of power are transformed in the nutrient direction, the social system will become more harmonious and better integrated.

With a university faculty engaging in activities designed for system development, the faculty members polarized at two poles: (1) the location of power and the use of power is clear; and (2) the location of power in the faculty and its use is unclear. Those few who held power positions moved to the first pole. The remaining members of the faculty, a majority, moved to the second pole. The dialogue-inquiry that followed generated changes in perceptions of power and changed some power relations to make them more legitimate and functional in the social system. When there is interaction (dialogue-inquiry) between actors in a social system, exploitative power is likely to be reduced and the (higher) integrative and nutrient powers are likely to be facilitated and enhanced.

Regarding s cial power May observes that the five kinds operate either consciously or unconsciously in the personality of each actor. He makes the following valid point:

> The question--and it is a moral one--is the proportion of each kind of power in the total spectrum of the personality. No one can escape experiencing, in desire and in action, all five types of power, and only self-righteous rigidity leads one to claim that he is immune from any one of them. The goal for human development is to learn to use these diffe-ent kinds of power in ways adequate to the given situation.[74]

Levels of Morality and Human Development

Kohlberg has postulated a system of moral education in a five stage hierarchy. His generic formula has proven to have empirical usefulness in that it differentiates between different age groups in the same general culture, and between different cultures. The formula has been used, therefore, to develop measuring procedures that yield, when used with human beings, data that can be analyzed. Also, Kohlberg and his associates have been able to derive teaching materials and techniques which when applied have the effect of changing children's moral thinking from a lower to a higher level in the hierarchy.[75] Thus Kohlberg's work is of singular importance to the theme of human foresight and moral re-education.

Kohlberg has constructed a concept of moral education on two of Dewey's principles, namely (1) moral education is identified with all kinds of education and growth, and (2) education is the application of the

> knowledge of the order and connection of the stages in the development of the psychical function...through supplying the conditions which will enable the psychical functions, as they successively arise, to mature and pass into higher functions in the freest and fullest manner.[76]

Kohlberg's conception satisfies the need for an explicit vertical dimension in philosophical terms in that he conceives justice to be the highest and most ideal value.

Kohlberg describes the lowest level as the preconventional in that the actor is responsive to cultural stereotypes of good or bad, right or wrong, interpreting the stereotypes in terms of gratification or punishment to him or in terms of the physical power of significant persons who reinforce the stereotype.[77]

> Developmental stage 1 is the obedience and punishment orientation: pain is avoided and deference is shown to power.
>
> Developmental stage 2 is the naively egoistic or the instrumental-relativist orientation: satisfying one's own needs is uppermost and human relations are viewed as appropriate through "market-place" eyes.

In conventional level 2, the actor is concerned with performing good or right roles in the social system and maintaining a conventional order in meeting the expectations of others.

> Developmental stage 3 is the interpersonal good boy or good girl orientation: conforming to stereotyped images of majority or natural role behavior and judging behavior by intentions rather than by consequences.
>
> Developmental stage 4 is the law and order orientation: showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

In postconventional level 3, the actor makes an effort to clarify moral values and to define moral principles which he applies to a given situation, achieving an independence of thought in respect to other individuals and groups with whom he is associated.

> Developmental stage 5 is the social-contract legalistic orientation: defining right action in terms of individual rights and norms that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the community. Emphasis is given to legal structures that may be changed through a rational process, with private opinions and highly personalized values being honored as long as they do not lead to acts that have morally degrading public consequences. This stage differs from the law and order orientation in that laws may be rationally changed when changing social and economic realities demand a change in the moral postulates of society. The social-contract legalistic orientation is the official morality of the U.S. constitution and government.
>
> Developmental stage 6 the highest stage, is the universal-ethical-principle orientation: defining right by the decision of conscience in accordance with ethical principles that are logically ordered. Justice is the touchstone or criterion for considering the genuiness of any human act that fits and is proper for the orientation.

There is a progressive enlargement of self-awareness that is needed as one moves from the lower level to the higher level. The lowest level of morality may be mechanically controlled by stimulus-response connections in the human organism, while the highest level requires a greater psychic density of self-awareness. Conscience becomes a crucial factor in developmental stage 6 and the requirement of a greater psychic density is due to the fact that conscience, according to Donagan,

> ...is the act of applying one's moral knowledge to one's own conduct.[78]

Because of the identity between moral and intellectual development, which Dewey postulated and Kohlberg followed, there is a mutual and reflective influence between consciousness and the capacity for personality harmony or unity, on the one hand, and for a moral judgment or act, on the other. For an actor to have a clear inner awareness is of paramount importance in other to be safeguarded against a corruption of consciousness.

In his Principles of Art, Collingwood develops the concept of the corruption of consciousness in the following:

> The untruthful consciousness in not making a bona fide mistake, for its faith is not good; it is shirking something which its business is to face. But it is not concealing the truth, for there is no truth which it knows and is concealing. Paradoxically, we may say that it is deceiving itself; but this is only a clumsy effort to explain what is happening within a single consciousness in the analogy of what may happen between one intellect and another.[79]

Assuming that self-awareness is a condition of a truthful consciousness and that justice requires intellectual work on the part of the actor, then Collingwood's further statement has relevance to the thesis of human foresight and moral re-education when he says:

> (a) truthful consciousness gives intellect a firm foundation on which to build; a corruption consciousness forces intellect to build on quicksand.[80]

As Kohlberg holds that justice is the highest value that the actor should strive to have reflected in his thinking and behavior, Rawls in his: A Theory of Justice holds that justice is the primary value which must be defined and guaranteed by any society. Its organization of the community and all of its institutions must be designed and managed to achieve justice. Rawls defines justice as fairness with its primordial guarantee to the individual being that of self-respect. According to Rawls, justice rests on two principles

> First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.... Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be for everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.[81]

The first principle takes priority over the second in that:

> a departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater social or economic advantages. The distribution of wealth and income, and the hierarchy of authority, must be consistent with both the liberties of equal citizenship and equality of opportunity.[82]

Lodge comments very appropriately on Rawls' theory in pointing out that his first principle is nonutilitarian:

> since it could well fail to result in the greatest good for the greatest number. Utilitarianism suggests that a society should seek the greatest overall balance of satisfaction, and this could well constrain liberty. (His) first principle is also non-Lockean, in that it places individual liberty above property in the ideological hierarchy by which justice is defined...he disposes of Locke's strangling loophole of equality by recognizing the necessity and justice of inequality. He argues that inequalities of wealth and power are just, but only when they can be reasonably expected to work to the advantage of those who are worst off... This argument has the great merit of recognizing the fact that we are born with unequal capabilities and qualities and will always be. It establishes the necessity, however, that this natural inequality be put to the service of the community of the whole.... As Marshall Cohen says; 'Justice does not require equality, but it does require that men share a common fate with one another'.[83]

Personal Polarity and Re-forming Social Norms

In the last section the good society was defined as one in which the principles of justice are universally applied in designing and managing its

institutions. As a person moves toward the ideal in Kohlberg's hierarchy his acts reflect a higher morality. Such acts would have the influence of contributing to the desirable re-forming of the social norms of society and its institutions.

It was argued also that the preparation of the person rested upon a psychological development that emphasizes self-awareness. This self-awareness is associated with a sense of self-integration that accompanies a centering on a polarity-continua. Dewey's concept of objectivism and subjectivism in modern philosophy provides the master polarity-continium in that both a subjective and an objective component are involved in other polarities such as freedom vs order.

The basic proposition is that the definition of appropriate behavior changes in its concrete manifestation as a situation and demands of social realities change. A social awareness that clarifies the normative structure of institutions, however, must accompany self-awareness if man and society are to be transformed in a mutually integrated manner.

Mannheim has provided an analysis of the need for the interdependence of an external method and an internal method of transforming man and society. He writes:

> The danger of the external method of transformation consists in the fact that it only outwardly changes society without really transforming man. As a result formal order (or institutional norms) and functional rationality exist side by side with an inner disorganization and lack of direction which constantly threaten to undermine important social institutions. The danger of the internal method consists of the fact that the few who, because of this kind of education, have a certain spiritual richness and personal culture break without resistance as soon as the special surroundings in which they move are destroyed by a sudden social upheavel (or continuous and pervasive social change). Here we can be helped only by interdependent action and thought which make use of both the internal and the external approaches in the sense that they combine at every step the transformation of society with the transformation of individual personality.[84]

The human potential movement or third force psychology founded by Maslow and others is very influential in America today. There are more than two hundred institutions that are providing resources for people to use in enhancing their human potential. The movement is marked by great diversity, but has a unifying paradigm expressed in Roger's words as follows:

> One of the most revolutionary concepts to grow out of our clinical experience is the growing recognition that the innermost core of man's nature, the deepest levels of personality, the base of his 'animal nature' is basically socialized, forward-moving, rational and realistic.[85]

This assertion is completely contradictory to Fromm's conception, cited above, of a polarity of both good and evil capacities.

The ideal of the fully functioning person according to Rogers is described in the following: he

> has knowledge of his own feelings, which are often complex and contradictory...is better able to permit his total organism, his conscious thought participating, to consider, weigh and balance each stimulus, need, and demand, and its relative weight and intensity.[86]

Although many people rightfully find this ideal and practice liberalizing, as a philosophy, however, this position has limited validity. In his book: Identity and Intimacy, Kilpatrick has characterized this type of person as having a fluid identity and incapable of maintaining intimacy that requires identity and a capacity to love. This person finds his most happy surroundings in a temporary society.

Gestalt therapy is a substantial component of the human potential movement. Its paradigm in relation to morality is epitomized by Pearls' Gestalt prayer which reads:

> I am I, and you are you; I'm not in this world to live up to your expectations, and you're not in this world to live up to mine.[87]

This pays homage, obviously, to a social system with only emergent or spontaneous norms, if it has any norms at all.

Mumford has made clear the central fallacy of the human potential emphasis in the following:

> Once the needs of the individual are separated from the claims of society, no criterion for the selection and expression remains. Social claims must balance personal needs as duties balance rights: otherwise the self becomes de-socialized, if not actively antisocial. Unlimited self-assertion leads to the destruction of personality.[88]

Erikson's conception of human development is more adequate than any provided by other schools of thought that are influential in the current human potential movement. Erikson's conception is based on a hierarchy of developmental stages and the principle of polarity. It is value-oriented and provides human development with a direction as well as an integration that is represented by a "person-in-culture" and by a person who is a participant in social reconstruction.

Erikson conceptualizes eight stages of the life cycle with a "virtuous outcome" for each when the critical polarity is adequately resolved, resulting in a "Favorable ratio", as the individual centers on the polarity-continium.[89] The stages, critical polarities and the "virtuous outcome" may be presented as follows:

Stage	Critical Polarity	"Virtuous Outcome"
8. Maturity	Ego integrity vs despair	Wisdom
7. Adulthood	Generativity vs stagnation	Care
6. Young adult	Intimacy vs isolation	Love
5. Adolescent	Identity vs role diffusion	Fidelty
4. Childhood	Industry vs inferiority	Competence
3. Early childhood	Initiative vs guilt	Purpose
2. Infant	Autonomy vs shame and doubt	Will power
1. Infant	Trust vs. mistrust	Hope

0 Birth _____ 80 + years

Infancy, childhood, youth, young adult, middle adult, old adult

Certain inferences may be drawn from Erikson's formula:

1. The positive side of personal functioning--trust, autonomy, generativity, etc. represent contributions, either potential or actual powers that the individual can use in societal reconstruction. When functioning at the negative poles, the individual does not have the power of societal reconstruction.

2. When functioning positively in terms of the polarities a normative structure of an institution is likely to result through human interactions that is based on the values of hope, willpower, purpose, etc.

3. Each stage may be redone in the recycling of the human career; for example, when an older person again works through the polarity of "trust vs mistrust" with a marriage mate or professional colleague.

4. Each stage has a potential of social contagion from one person to another through social contact and sharing. Mistrust breeds mistrust; love breeds love; competence breeds competence; and stagnation breeds stagnation. Therefore, as a person moves through the stages of life he has a responsibility for exercising a brotherliness or a sisterliness, thus contributing responsibility to societal maintenance and reconstruction.

5. Either growth that enables the person to "develop fully" in a stage and become "fully ready" for the next stage, or a developmental arrest in some degree may occur at any stage. Whether growth or arrestation takes place is determined by the educative force or growth facilitation structures in the persons's environment. Dialogue-inquiry with significant others that focus attention upon the objective and subjective aspects of a relevant polarity is necessary if growth is to be assured.

Sullivan explains the antecedent conditions for developmental arrest and states the case for dialogue-inquiry regarding one's own polarities, as set forth

in Erikson's formulation, as follows:

> What is it that brings about favorable change in a person? How do patterns of living undergo significant alteration for the better? ... The thing that keeps people from favorable change...is that they do not learn anything from (their) experiences...if one assumes that man is as highly adaptive as I always try to suggest that he is, the great question is: Why does a given person not overcome the handicap to learning? Why is he not moving forward? The answer lies in the fact that at some time in the past (or present) it became dangerous for him to inquire into certain aspects of what happened to him. That is, such inquiry (dialogue-inquiry with another human being) became so frought with anxiety that he goes on year after year feeling threatened by experiences in some particular field. That experience may be anything from telling a superior what he really thinks, to approaching apparently genial members of the other sex with an idea of perfecting his acquaintance with them by genital behavior.[90]

Dialogue-inquiry that is concurrent with the experience or personal happenings regarding trust vs mistrust, autonomy vs shame and doubt and Erikson's other six critical polarities, is a necessary condition for developing a human career at the maximum potential of the person.

Bases for Human Foresight: Two Case Applications

In the last section three bases for human foresight were developed: (1) human power differentiated into kinds that may be placed on a vertical scale progressing from the less ideal to the more ideal conception and control of power (May's analysis provides a foundation for this understanding of human power); (2) levels of morality extending vertically from the obedience and punishment orientation to the better morality which involves the application of the principle of justice in societal reconstruction (Kohlberg's and Rawls' analyses give a rationale for this basis for human foresight); and (3) a conception of human development that involves a vertical dimension, a direction and the centering of the actor on eight different continuia-polarities extending from the trust vs mistrust polarity to ego-integrity vs despair polarity. (Erikson's formulation is at the heart of this conception). Self awareness and the conscientious

application of the knowledge available about these three elements to one's own conduct are crucial factors for the actor, or actors collectively, in generating human foresight.

In his conception of freedom developed in Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey writes:

> Morality depends upon events, not upon commands and ideals alien to nature. But intelligence treats events as moving, as fraught with possibilities, not as ended, final. In forecasting their possibilities, the distinction between better and worse arises. Human desire and ability cooperate with this or that natural force according as this or that eventuality is judged better. We do not use the present to control the future. We use the foresight of the future to refine and expand present activities. In this use of desire, deliberation and choice, freedom is actualized.[91]

This statement suggests the necessity for the actor to maintain a balance between objectivism and subjectivism in exercising foresight. In the context of analyzing the pattern of inquiry in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, published in 1938, sixteen years after Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey, however, comes down very hard on the side of objectivism. He writes:

> A variety of names serves to characterize indeterminant situations (for which inquiry is the process by which a transformation of the indeterminant situation into a unified whole is achieved). They are disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc. It is the situation that has these traits...(they) cannot be straightened out...by manipulation of our personal states of mind.... Restoration of integration can be effected...only by operations which actually modify conditions, not by merely mental processes.[92]

The internal functionings of the problem-solver are excluded from the indeterminant situation that needs inquiry and action. It is for this reason, I presume, that Troutner asked for a partnership of pragmatism and existentialism above when he insists that the Dewey conception be modified to include and honor the notion of self-transcendence. I agree, Foresight, inquiry (problem-solving) and planning, as human processes, require that the actor or actors each go beyond his self in the present, "my person-in-process"--either back into one's history or forward

into the future. This requires self-awareness as a condition for centering and re-centering on appropriate polarity -continiua. Then in Dewey's words:

> We (can) use the foresight of the future to refine and expand present activities.

As a necessary extension and modification of Dewey's analysis, Mannheim uses the concept of "situation" as the characteristic unit of planned thinking, and configurations even more complex than a situation. He writes:

> At the level of planning it is more and more necessary to think in terms of situations as wholes. It is essential not only in practical life but in science itself, to know how to fit together in one's mind the different series of events, and to see how individual events, institutions, and attitudes of mind are determined by each other.[93]

The actor must make his own attitude of mind a factor in the situation if there is to result from inquiry a transformation of himself that is necessarily interdependent with societal reconstruction.

Case 1 grows out of physicist O'Neill's foresight of space colonies so that by 1990 human beings could start living in them.[94] According to scientists the necessary technology is already available in an early form and its further development awaits only an action plan for going ahead. Advantages to future mankind are: (1) through using technology for capturing energy on a colony and relaying it to earth, man would have an abundant and inexhaustible supply, and (2) colonies would offer a new freedom and a great diversity for the development of the human career in the future. O'Neill holds that a cooperative multinational program of development is desirable.

Physicist Csonka believes in the feasibility of space colonization.[95] Without proper safeguards, however, the prospect may prove to be an invitation to disaster. Unless global government is created and well established in advance of space colonizing, except on a small scale and carefully controlled pilot basis, the results, according to Csonka, "may be an era of space wars and piracy".

He believes that the subject of space colonization is such an important one that a dialogue (dialogue-inquiry) must be started in which all the possible ramifications for society are brought out into the open before a commitment is made. I am in agreement with Csonka's analysis, his foresight of a possible "universal" disaster, and his asking for systematic dialogue and inquiry.

The anthropologist-philosopher Maruyama characterizes the space colonization project as an opportunity to develop new cultural patterns and new philosophies. His analysis is very imaginative and provides prospects and alternatives for mankind that stimulate the dialogue that Csonka is seeking. Maruyama describes the educational task and the desideratum of keeping all nations on an equal footing as the enterprise is refined and expanded, and is finally culminated. He writes:

> There will be 15 or 20 years between now and the completion of the first extraterrestial community in which to prepare the first immigrants for the experience. What we need is not merely technological training, but also much broader education, including different logics and epistemologies (and I would add metaphysics). There is no ready-made educational system for this, and we must begin from scratch. Therefore, all nations are on an equal footing. If we begin now, in 15 or 20 years all nations will have produced potential immigrants to the first extraterrestrial community.[96]

In the redesigning education that Maruyama sees as needed, consideration should be given to a design that emphasizes self-awareness and the capacity to center and re-center on critical human polarities involved in Erikson's eight stages, as well as other polarities, and including self-transcendence in regard to levels of morality and the use of different kinds of human power.

LeShan has provided a response to the need for educational re-design that is consistent with my suggestion, but which responds more directly to an education "including different logics and epistemologies (with metaphysics added)." In his book: Alternate Realities, the search for the full human being, LeShan

develops a conceptual system that embraces his demonstration of a practical and everyday world in which there is not one reality, but a choice of realities. We invent-discover four realities. One fits and is limited to Dewey's objectivism. The other three embrace Dewey's pole of subjectivism. In the sensory modes of being we can deal with questions of physical sciences and biological survival. In the second reality--the clairvoyant modes of being, we are able to experience directly the oneness of all being. Transpsychic modes of being give us the perception of a world in which all objects and events are separate from each other, yet flow into a larger one. The fourth kind of subjectivism embraces the mythic modes of being that control our perceptions of reality in play, art, and in dreams.

In my view the analysis is relevant to an education that is preparatory to extraterrestrial colony living. LeShan explains his position as follows:

> These four classes of modes of being--the sensory, the clairvoyant, the transpsychic, and the mythic--are the ways of inventing-discovering reality of which we are clearly aware at this time as necessary for the fullest development of human beings. We must accept the validity of all four and live in them in order to give our total being the nourishment it needs.[97]

Case 2 has to do with the work done at the Stanford Research Institute's International Center for the Study of Social Policy. Using a variety of problem search strategies for estimating or foresighting the future, the researchers have identified and described forty-one societal problems, such as critical advances in biomedical technology, loss of cultural diversity, lack of functional life skills in adults, the potential use and misuse of "consciousness technologies" and the growing conflict between central and individual freedom, to name a few.

According to the authors,

> the problems are systematic in nature, involving diverse social institutions, sectors, and strata, and impinging on various problems in a

> widespread and pervasive manner. As a result, the problems confront a dispersed and largely uncoordinated set of decision-making with varied interests and approaches.[98]

These problems, therefore, require what Mannheim has described as a planned thinking approach, and furthermore an institutional re-orientation so that planned thinking becomes the norm and modus operandi.

The authors also state that

> The problems significantly involve attitudes, values, and beliefs, and are typically viewed from a wide range of perspectives.[99]

As an example, the problem of the growing conflict between central control and individual freedom will require a process and pattern of on-going dialogue-inquiry that involves certain crucial factors: the use and control of different kinds of power, a moral judgment and conduct that is nourished by the self-awareness of the actor, and a continuous self-development of actors that progressively resolves such critical polarities as represented in Erikson's eight stages of life. Also, LeShan's conception of epistemology, logic and metaphysics are useful in the needed societal and institutional reconstruction.

The Discipline of Dialogue-Inquiry

In this section, the concept of an educational methodology is developed that has two aspects: (1) a discipline of dialogue-inquiry; and (2) normative re-education. (Moral and normative re-education may be used interchangeably, for my purposes, although normative is a broader term in that it embraces not only moral norms, but also norms that have to do with the arts and the control of science and technology. The focus of the discussion, however, is upon moral considerations).

Margaret Mead in Culture and Commitment makes a useful distinction between three different kinds of culture; postfigurative, cofigurative, and prefigurative.

In the cofigurative, both children and adults learn from their peers. In the prefigurative, adults learn also from their children. Mead says:

> Great civilizations, which necessarily have developed techniques for incorporating change, characteristically make use of some form of configurative learning from peers, playmates, fellow students, and fellow apprentices. We are now entering a period, new in history, in which the young are taking on a new authority in the prefigurative apprehension of the still unknown future.[100]

It follows, therefore, that in the use of dialogue-inquiry and in an involvement of normative re-education, adults must participate with children and youth. The participation will have to extend, most likely, beyond the home and the church into the formal educational structures of schools.

Without a cofigurative pattern combined with the prefigurative the demands of man and society in an age of reconstruction will not be satisfied. The proposition is underscored by Read in his: The Redemption of the Robot in the following:

> All attempts to effect social changes by educational methods are subject to one almost insuperable difficulty--the fact that we, the adult majority in the community, already consider ourselves educated. Only in rare cases are we willing to submit ourselves to a process of re-education.[101]

Together, adults and children, need to address what is real both in their respective worlds and in their one world. These are multiple realities as James so clearly indicated.[102] Through dialogue and inquiry adults and children can keep clear the particular reality references that are involved in their interactions with one another.

Regarding social realities, Robinson described teaching in 1950 that is not too dissimilar to the unfortunate impact of schools today. He wrote:

> Think of a teacher in the public schools recounting the more illuminating facts about the municipal government under which he lives, with due attention to graft and jobs. So, courses in government, political economy, sociology, and others confine themselves to inoffensive generalizations, harmless details of organization, and the commonplaces of routine morality, for only

> in that way can be escape being controversial. Teachers are rarely able or inclined to explain our social life and its presuppositions with sufficient insight and honesty to produce any important results. Even if they are tempted to tell the essential facts they dare not do so, for fear of losing their places, amid the applause of all the righteously minded...We sedulously inculcate in the coming generation exactly the same illusions and the same ill-placed confidence in...institutions...that have brought the world to the pass in which we find it.[103]

In "Normative Instruction in the Elementary School" I have presented a very small view of the school that could be. A case of solving a noon-hour problem is presented involving fifth and sixth grade boys in a conflict in using school facilities for playing basketball and involving basketball players vs non-basketball players. The children participated in a dialogue-inquiry pattern with the guidance of the teacher, in analyzing the problem and creating a new normative structure that lead to reconstruction of the original situation and to the restoration of harmonious relations between the children.

The following quotations[104] present some essential elements of normative re-education:

> Consensus and cooperation among people break down because new conditions that come to function in their relationship...There was evidence that the essential conflict was being transferred by some children to other school situations...Attitudes which would remain with children throughout their future life were being shaped by the situation...In the discussion period the teacher helped the pupils to see how the situation had changed. The discrepancy between what had been intended for noon-hour activity and what had actually resulted was made explicit. The new condition of the game was giving rise to conflicts and tensions between individuals; it was dividing the class community. The understanding of this became one step toward solving the problem. The original plan was made in view of specific noon-hour conditions, hence modification of the conditions called for modification of the original plan. Seeing the difficulty in terms of conflicting value-perspectives was necessary. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the reconstruction of value-perspectives is essential to the process of planning.

The poignancy of the need for the school to become more potent in normative re-education is made clear by Richmond, a fifth grade teacher in Brooklyn whose

analysis I learned about in reading Lodge's The New Ideology. Richmond writes:

> Mass society has generated the kind of alienation that allows neighbors to live side by side without knowing each other. It has produced human experience that is fragmented, often ideologically and aesthetically bankrupt, an impersonal world that may be over-industrialized and over-mechanized. Together these components of modern life sum to a condition of self-alientation and estrangement from society...If the student is lucky, he will graduate from school with a piecemeal understanding of how the major institutions of society operate. He will have obtained fractions of experience without having been exposed to the ideological networks that order that experience and make it coherent. He will look at the 'great society' he enters as a large, unmanageable, chaotic series of stimuli that will atrophy every response he makes to them.[105]

The concept of education reflected obversely in this description is a far cry from the impoverished conception of education portrayed in the recent CBS three hour program: "Is anyone out there learning?" which was limited to the basic three R's. Even when well learned such basics can accompany in the life of the student "a condition of self-alienation and estrangement from society", unless the basics are emphasized within the educational context of attention being given "to the ideological networks that order that experience and make it coherent."[106]

Dialogue-inquiry has its source in two different traditions: respresented in (1) "The Civilization of the Dialogue", The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,[107] and (2) Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.[108] It is an interweaving of two processes: (a) the process whereby two or more persons reveal their feelings and thoughts to one another with a reciprocal awareness of the threat to self-esteem that may be involved for each participant; (b) the process whereby two or more persons ask and answer questions that are relevant to their situation. When the pattern of dialogue-inquiry is systematic and mature in that it is tending toward the ideal, it has the following properties:

1. Dialogue activates inquiry. The specific functions of inquiry are given form and meaning by dialogue. The components of inquiry may be specified as follows: (a) evaluating the validity and relevance of thought; (b) describing and evaluating reality; (c) formulating and analyzing problems; (d) setting goals; (e) elaborating and examining alternative plans; and (f) acting to implement a plan for changing a reality.

Dialogue among participants in conducting an inquiry, not only activates inquiry, but also facilitates the reflexive influence of inquiry, particularly when attention is focused upon themselves as individuals. For example, predicting their own behavior or making interpersonal comparisons influences them to either diminish or intensify a trend. Foote and Cottrell attribute the success of psychoanalysis to the "reflexive influence of inquiry upon the characteristic behavior of the persons studied (and engaged in self-study), since it accomplishes desirable changes in personal integration by causing the subjects to raise to conscious recollection the meaning of past (and present) acts and relations."[109]

2. It is unifying rather than divisive. The commitment is to persons in the first place and to ideas in the second. The intent is not to persuade much less to annihilate. Defensiveness is not stimulated because a threat to self-esteem is dealt with early in its development as soon as a participant becomes aware. It is unifying among persons rather than divisive as debate and argumentation tend to be.

3. It is at once unifying and diversifying of relations among participants, their ideas, values, policies and utopias. It never means the suppression of personal polarities and cultural differences among participants. When it succeeds it generates a spectrum of alternative ideas, identities, feelings and strategies for action.

4. Dialogue-inquiry facilitates consensus and decision-making. Consensus

is necessary for action and it comes as a result of independent self-deciding participation of the persons involved in the process. The intent is not to secure consent to the point of view of either the communicator or the authority or the power figure.

Out of the process comes a balanced decision which takes account of all sides, even those in total disagreement at a stage of the process. What emerges is a consensus which calls for the respect of the participants whether they fully agree or not.

On the basis of such a consensus a project of social action may be planned and carried out that goes beyond the interests of a particular individual or special group, but nevertheless does justice to what has been said on every side and is responsive to the participants' hopes for the future.

5. The continuity of dialogue-inquiry. It always develops in a time structure, hopefully through the renewed efforts of former participants and involving new participants to enlarge and extend the community. Consensus is always temporary, if not precarious, and requires continuous attention in maintaining a moving and organic balance between such opposing forces in every human situation as freedom and authority, growth and decay, status quo and progress, stability and change, etc.

When interrupted, dialogue-inquiry may need very much to be reinstituted with the more competent or powerful individual or group taking the initiative.

Friedmann in his Retracking America places great store on dialogue (I would substitute dialogue-inquiry) in his theory of transactive planning. He is also mindful, and appropriately, of the pitfalls of dialogue-inquiry in the following:

> Most of us are afraid to become truly authentic as human beings, to join our feelings to reason, to turn completely to the other in all his particularity, listening to what he says beyond the logic of

> semantics and responding with care to his essential needs as a person caught up in a concrete situation. Most of us are either unable or unwilling to sustain such dialogue (dialogue-inquiry), especially when we feel threatened. We withdraw defensively inside our shells, closing the doors to our innermost selves, and leave the protective 'space between' ourselves and others to be filled with programmed messages to convey essential meaning.[110]

Dialogue-inquiry is involved in solving the technical problems of life and physical sciences, as well as, of the social sciences. Our focus, however, is on ideological, normative and moral problems. I have written:

> It is not possible to resolve such situations solely by means of a discipline assuring that a person is sensitive to facts and is technically skillful. A choice has to be made between mutually exclusive courses of action, each promising to satisfy different and seemingly incompatible values. Such a normative situation involves conflicts between different lines of moral allegiance. It is social in that it involves the welfare of other people... All political, social, and economic problems are normative situations. Although facts have a function in solving such problems, value-judgments are basic to their solution.[111]

A normative structure takes form through human interaction that occurs interpersonally and within the context of the organization and community. A structure may be composed of several norms, each of which is a value-laden pattern. Norms may be transferred from one human situation to another. A norm may be perpetuated from a prior situation and re-instituted in current circumstances. Whether carried over with full force or created semi-anew, a norm is a value pattern that generates an expectation for a particular behavior (or avoidance of the behavior) by an individual actor or a group of actors and facilitates that behavior (or avoidance).

A norm has both a factual and an ideal aspect. The sociologist Selznick addresses himself to the factual and ideal in the following:

> Social scientists are not troubled by the idea of a norm or standard of behavior. A great deal of anthropological and sociological writing is devoted to the description and analysis of norms and systems of norms (or normative structure)...From the standpoint of the observer, norms are factual data and that is that. But suppose

> we are interested in the following: friendship, scholarship, statesmanship, love, fatherhood, citizenship, consensus, reason, public opinion, culture (in its commonsense and value-laden meaning), democracy. (The list could be extended to include justice and Erikson's "virtuous outcomes"--wisdom, care, love, fidelity, competence, purpose, will power, and hope.) These and a great many other similar phenomena are normative systems, in a special and strong sense of the term. I have in mind more than a set of related norms. A democracy is a normative system in that much complex behavior (as well as many specific norms) is governed by a master ideal. Behavior, feeling, thought, and organization are all bound together by a commitment to the realization of democratic values. It is impossible to understand any of these phenomena without also understanding what ideal states are to be approximated. In addition we must understand what forces are produced in the system, and what pressures exerted on it which inhibit or facilitate fulfilling the ideal.[112]

In respect to the factual aspect of a norm, an institution or any human relationship over a period of time may develop dysfunctional norms as a result of economic, technological, political, social and other changes in a community, the nation or the world. Dysfunctional norms are indicated by hidden agendas, unaware interpersonal complicities, unexposed abuse of power, deliberate collusions, excessive normative incoherence, and the avoidance of problems and conflicts. A social pathology may result. Such dysfunctional norms, are for the most part, unconsciously and stereotypically held by actors. They tend to persevere until examined deliberately and openly by people associated with an institution or human relationship, perhaps painfully, with the most competent and/or an authority figure taking the initiative for relevant dialogue-inquiry. The great isms--ageism, sexism, racism, classism and internationalism that generate tensions that cause war, are examples of dysfunctional norms.

Normative re-education requires that dialogue-inquiry be addressed to five targets of focused attention: (1) the self: (2) interpersonal relations and small group; (3) institutional norms; (4) societal norms and (5) international relations, as further elaborated in what follows.

1. Attention needs to be given to the self as an intra-psychological

development of the person emphasizing self-awareness, self-identity and self-insight. The human potential movement, discussed above, gives a great deal of attention to this kind of human development.

In his A Guide for the Perplexed, Schuacher has held self-knowledge as central to his thesis, and has written wisely as evidenced in the following:

> Self-knowledge, so universally praised as the valuable, remains worse than useless if it is based solely on the study of one's own inner experiences; it must be balanced by an equally intensive study through which we learn to know ourselves as others know us.[113]

Another pole in an adequate configuration of human functioning is described as follows:

> Finally, there is social knowledge, that is, the knowledge needed for establishing of harmonious relationships among people. Since we have no direct access...to the inner experiences of other beings--obtaining indirect access is one of man's most important tasks as a human being. This indirect access can be gained only through self-knowledge, which shows that it is a grave error to accuse a man who pursues self-knowledge of 'turning his back on society'. The opposite would be more nearly true: that a man who fails to pursue self-knowledge is and remains a danger to society, for he will tend to misunderstand everything that other people say or do, and remain blissfully unaware of the significance of many of the things he does himself.[114]

There are many resources available to be used in intra-psychological development of the person. LeShan advances meditation as a guide to self-discovery in his How to Meditate.[115] It is appropriate for adults and young people.

Stevens' Awareness[116] sets forth in a practical and useable manner more than one hundred experiments in expanding your awareness of yourself, your surroundings, and your interaction with others. Stevens' recommendations and suggestions are based on Perls' Gestalt therapy. I have used the exercises in a classroom in which young adults participated.

The Centering Book[117] by Hendricks and Wills describes awareness activities for children, parents,and teachers. All the exercises are useful. The

discussion of Senoi, a people that live in the Central Malay Peninsula, is insightful and suggestive of a norm that our society might consider adopting. Dream work in the Senoi society is part of the normative structure. Practicing the techniques of working with dreams in the American educational system could have very good effects. The practice could legitimatize the unconscious, and open avenues to Jung's collective unconscious, and thereby allow new archetypes to emerge or be created as needed for an ideological or basic normative transformation of our society.

2. Interpersonal and small group relations embrace all human relations that are face-to-face. The character of face-to-face relations influence the quality of an actor's identity, self-awareness and the manner of his action. The sociologist Etzioni has referred to the normative pattern in clarifying these phenomena in the following:

> The identity of the actor is his position in a normative-cognitive pattern.... Self-identity is the place an actor sees himself as occupying in this pattern. It is tantamount to the specification of his values and his knowledge of himself.... The higher the level of self-awareness of an actor, the more likely he is to clarify his identity and focus it; the more he is aware of his boundaries, of his place vis-a-vis others, the more delineated we expect his self-identity to be.... The clearer and more focused the self identity of an actor, and/or the more self-conscious he is, the more active he may be. The self-identity of an actor is related to the values to which he is committed and to the goals he pursues. Within broad limits, we expect that the more specific this identity is, the more guidance for action it will provide. Similarly, self-consciousness will tend to make an actor take his basic commitments into account to a great extent in his decision-making.[118]

There are norms that are critical to effective dialogue-inquiry. In interpersonal and small group interaction, actors may examine and experiment with norms that are based upon such values as: expressing feelings and ideas freely, satisfaction with participation, frustration with process, taking responsibility for an activity or decision-making, and commitment to persons or action. Data may be obtained on the form:

I view myself as:

Low | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | High

I view other group members as:

A dialogue-inquiry focused on the group session in light of the data obtained and revealed, is likely to facilitate the enhancement of self-awareness and identity, the importance of which to societal reconstruction, Etzioni has made clear in: The Active Society.

In facilitating self-awareness and clarifying identity, an actor can serve a mediating role in the dialogue-inquiry process. This role is basic to therapy and teaching, but can function usefully in all human relations. It is paradoxical in form since the mediator moves from one pole to another of a continium as he interacts with others. Fingarette has appropriately named this midwife role that of the enlightened-agonist which he ascribes to such great human figures as Socrates, Jesus and Gautama Buddha. Fingarette writes:

> We find in many cultures the ideal of the enlightened-agonist; he who consistently guides us through the ordeal which liberates, who joins in it though he is above it, who is disinterestedly our burden and our ally... (He) represents a human being of unwavering and selfless dedication to individuals in their struggle for spiritual transformation...represents the penetrating power of understanding...grasps the other's human condition in the very act of dialogue with him...responds to the person, not with a theory.[119]

There are useful questions that may become a part of dialogue-inquiry in the interpersonal or small group situation. Intra-psychological development is enhanced when the following questions are responded to: (1) Of what are you aware?; (2) What are you doing now?; (3) What are you feeling?; (4) What do you want?; (5) What are you avoiding?; and (6) What are you expecting?

3. Institutional norms need the attention of dialogue-inquiry. They are extremely important because they form the basis and framework for policies and decisions in the school, family, business, government and church by influencing the attitudes and action of an actor or a group of actors.

4. Societal norms function at the levels of the local community, state and nation to provide and legitimize a general societal context wherein institutional norms are formed, legitimized or changed. Societal norms may be represented by concrete conditions that people tolerate or seek to correct. They may also take the form of ideals that people seek to realize.

5. The normative structure of international relations needs fresh and penetrating dialogue-inquiry, participated in by government officials and through people-to-people contacts. The transformation of the United Nations organization into a legitimate world government is needed and should be placed on the human agenda for achievement within the next decade.

The need for normative re-education is frequently evidenced in the conventional wisdom of the culture. Such an instance is presented in a recent reference to the Carter-Begin-Sadat conference when Reston commented as follows:

> ...it is one of the generally accepted rules of diplomacy that you never commit government leaders to a summit meeting unless their advisors have agreed in advance to how it will turn out.[120]

Such an arrogant position, of course, precludes any dialogue-inquiry that could morally re-educate the leaders of nations regarding international norms.

The ideal of a global government has been described in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

A reconstructed normative context at the global level is urgently needed within which the "less universal" normative problems of the individual, interpersonal and group relations, and the institutional and societal crises may be solved. Reischauer in his Toward the 21st Century: Education for a Changing World, has underscored the urgency of global level reconstruction in the following:

> A sense of world citizenship embracing all national groupings and the acceptance of ethnic diversity within our own nation are really two sides of the same coin. Both accent the universality of man

> and help place the national unit in proper perspective as only one of several successive levels of human organization. The focus on mankind and his civilization as the subject of education includes the ethnic minorities in a way that a narrow focus on the dominant national tradition does not.[121]

In respect to all moral or normative considerations involved in the use of political and military power, and in economic relations, the nation must also be placed in a proper perspective in relation to world citizenship.

What is the work of the school and education in whatever form it may be experienced? Education should supply the normative corrections needed in the real world. Meeting this task of education requires a dialogue-inquiry that touches the boundary of a continuously expanding community of individuals, and that continuously returns the individual to his evolving self.

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